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Preindustrial and Postwar Economic Development:
Is There a Link?*
John P. Burkett
University of Rhode Island
Catherine Humblet
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Louis Putterman
Brown University
Everybody knows now that the ‘‘hardware’’ dimension
of development—the physical infrastructure, for example—is
a lot easier to put in place than the ‘‘software’’ to keep it op-
erable, which depends on local skills and institutions. (United
Nations Development Programme)1
I. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, former colonies and other less
developed countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have been
viewed as taking part in a race toward modern economic development,
with widely varying results. During the past decade, the question of why
some countries’ economies have grown rapidly and others slowly or not
at all has helped to motivate a new body of research using a variety of
neoclassical growth models and cross-country regression techniques.
Such studies have generally supported the hypothesis that growth rates
are a positive function of investment rates and that they are a negative
function of initial income—that is, that poorer countries tend to grow
faster, all else being equal. In some cases, they have also supported addi-
tional hypotheses, such as those linking growth to education, to govern-
ment policies, or to other variables, including political stability or ethnic
heterogeneity. However, an important part of the variation in growth
rates typically remains unexplained, and this unexplained variation is
ª 1999 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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472 Economic Development and Cultural Change
strongly correlated with the regions in which countries are situated, a
seemingly noneconomic variable.
In this article, we provide evidence for the hypothesis that a sub-
stantial portion of the conventionally unexplained variation in perfor-
mance among LDCs is due to differences in economic and social precon-
ditions to modern economic growth that have not heretofore received
systematic attention in the economics literature. The new growth litera-
ture treats all countries as being on a par in the growth race, but for the
types of variables mentioned above. The old postwar literature on eco-
nomic development itself typically recognizes two basic states or stages
of development: the traditional, preindustrial, or underdeveloped and the
modern, industrial, or developed.2 The departure of this study is to pro-
vide evidence that conceptualizing long-run social and economic devel-
opment—most of it preceding the modern era—as a multistage process
sheds light on the differential performances of countries in recent de-
cades.3 In particular, we turn our attention to the initial position of socie-
ties composing a present-day nation on a production-system-intensity
continuum that stretches from low-population-density hunter-gatherer
societies, on the one extreme, to high-population-density agriculture-
based societies marked by large states, taxation, and specialized com-
merce, on the other. We propose that this position is an important pre-
dictor of a nation’s growth performance in recent decades, even after
controlling for the determinants of growth treated in the standard litera-
ture.4 This link between preindustrial economies and recent growth per-
formance suggests that premodern economies left their traces on socie-
ties’ stocks of human and perhaps physical capital in ways that are not
adequately measured by flows or stocks of formal schooling, initial in-
come, or investment. Our hypothesis is that societies that are located
closer to the high-intensity end of the continuum of premodern economic
formations require a less dramatic transformation, in terms of economic
practices and behaviors, and thus tend to make the shift to industrializa-
tion more rapidly than those societies that are located nearer to the oppo-
site end of this continuum.5
II. Premodern Economies and Modern Development Capacity
With its focus on modern market economies, or in some instances on the
transition to industrialization, neoclassical economics has generally been
content to view economies as fundamentally similar, or to distinguish,
at most, between ‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘modern’’ ones. However, in the
longer view of human development taken by many anthropologists, ar-
cheologists, and demographers, human society has passed through nu-
merous stages between the primitive era of hunting and gathering and
the industrial societies of today’s more developed countries. The thesis
of this article is that the type of economy that characterized today’s
nation-states before they began their transition to industrialization is likely
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to have an impact on the speed with which they make that transition.
Economies starting from ‘‘less developed’’ positions in terms of the de-
velopmental hierarchy of E. Boserup and others will initially experience
slower growth, as it takes longer for them to achieve the preconditions
of modern development that must be embodied in the broad human and
perhaps also physical capital of their societies. Under ‘‘broad human
capital’’ we include attitudes and capabilities that may fall outside the
scope of formal education, as well as a stock of ideas and knowledge
that is held collectively by a population through a complex division of
cognitive labor, and that may not be sufficient if imparted only to a few
individuals.6 Forms of premodern physical capital may include canal and
irrigation systems, which may have low or nonexistent market valuations
and which will be little reflected in a country’s income at the onset of
industrialization because their effects on output tend to be roughly offset
by corresponding effects on population.
Why should we expect that the characteristics of premodern societ-
ies have helped to determine the growth performances of modern nations
in recent decades, when all faced similar conditions of national indepen-
dence, of exposure to world trade and technology, and of at least bi- and
multilateral support for development? Six possibilities that we merely
list, for brevity, are (a) that the premodern legacy influences conceptions
and practices of productive activity, including willingness to supply ar-
duous hours of work, which is hypothesized to be greater among inten-
sive agriculturalists than among extensive farmers or pastoralists; (b) that
premodern technical skills differ in their similarity to those needed in
industrial societies, with those of advanced agrarian societies being more
readily adapted to industrial needs; (c) that there is greater economic in-
dependence of households and a higher degree of commercialization and
trade in advanced agricultural societies; (d ) that agricultural societies
had a head start for modern state development conferred by premodern
experience with large-scale polities; (e) that there are related advantages
conferred by greater social homogeneity, which is established across
larger groups where state-level organization was achieved earlier; and
( f ) that higher population density lowers the cost of internal trade.
III. Testing the Hypothesis
There are a variety of ways in which one can investigate linkages be-
tween contemporary nations’ recent economic performance and the types
of premodern economies that they had. In this article, we test the hypoth-
esis on cross-country data, as in the recent growth literature mentioned
in our introduction. Our approach is to adopt a growth equation that
matches closely those used in other studies and to add to it independent
variables as a proxy for the preindustrial development (PID) stage of
each included country. While we have no argument with the view that
this methodology has reached a point of diminishing returns in many ap-
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plications, the long-view approach pursued here is unlike any in the ex-
tant growth literature, and we adopt the standard cross-country format to
control for other variables as well as to facilitate comparability with
other studies.7 A key question remains how PID is to be measured.
While some conceptually interesting approaches can be thought of,
most run up against problems of data availability. However, there exist
data for a reasonably large number of countries on three relevant indica-
tors of social evolutionary development. First, information on population
density before the recent push for development should be indicative of
developmental stage, according to the Boserupian framework. Second,
widely available information on the amount of land cultivated per farmer
can be treated as a proxy for cultivation intensity, another indicator of
the proposed evolutionary continuum. Third, information on the propor-
tion of the cultivated land that is irrigated may also indicate production-
system intensity. Irrigation systems directly require additional labor for
construction and management, and for agricultural tasks such as sowing
multiple crops on a given parcel. Irrigation systems are therefore histori-
cally associated with higher population densities, as well as with state-
level organization, taxes, written language, and social stratification.
The three indicators are not necessarily without drawbacks. It might
be more instructive to look at the population density of each country’s
inhabited areas, so that density figures used are not influenced by arbi-
trary variation in the amount of uninhabitable wasteland within its bor-
ders. However, population per unit of cultivated land, an available rough
proxy for population density of each country’s inhabited area, is highly
correlated with farmers per hectare. Since we get more information by
focusing on the two distinct variables, we retain them and briefly report
tests with the alternative variable in Section V.8
Problems with the farmer-to-land ratio include its lack of controls
for the prevalence of noncultivating modes like hunting-and-gathering or
pastoralism.9 Recourse to irrigation is arguably an outcome of unfavor-
ably timed rainfall.10 Failure to control for soil quality may also be a
problem. However, the ideal way to do that is unclear, and indeed Bo-
serup and others have argued that soil quality is to a significant degree
an endogenous outcome of cultivation intensity (including mixed hus-
bandry and agriculture practices).
Perhaps the most serious problem with the measures that are avail-
able is the lack of broad cross-country data for periods earlier than World
War II. We are forced, therefore, to treat the data on population densities,
cultivation intensities, and irrigation rates in the early 1960s as proxies
for the preindustrial economic orders of today’s developing countries. In
one case we were able to test the adequacy of these proxies. Population
density data for 1911 are available for a total of 76 countries, of which
66 also provide data for 1960. It is reassuring that the simple correlation
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between the two sets of measures is .8199, and the Pearsson rank correla-
tion is .8960, which has a p-value of .0001. Tests of our hypothesis using
the 1911 values for the subsample providing them are reported below.
However, the main part of our analysis is done with 1960 values, which
are available for a much larger sample of countries and for all three of
our PID measures.
The rest of our growth equation follows the format suggested by
R. Levine and D. Renelt, who surveyed a number of cross-country
growth studies.11 Like Levine and Renelt, we regress the rate of growth
of GDP per capita for a cross-section of countries on four principal inde-
pendent variables—initial GDP per capita, average investment share in
GDP, population growth rate, and measures of formal education. Includ-
ing initial GDP per capita controls for the possibility that poorer coun-
tries will grow faster as a result of forces toward convergence of devel-
opment levels. Investment and education are expected to be positively
associated with growth, while high population growth might slow eco-
nomic growth due to higher per capita costs for education and social ser-
vices, among other factors.12 We add one more variable, aside from our
PID measures, to the basic Levine and Renelt data set. Measures of price
distortion used in several recent growth studies are excellent predictors
of growth performance.13 There are good economic grounds for ex-
pecting this to be the case, since distorted prices can lead to misalloca-
tion of resources and thus to lower returns on given levels of investment
and of resource endowments. We use the black market premium mea-
sure, which seems most satisfactory from a conceptual standpoint.14 Fi-
nally, as in the articles cited, we check for the explanatory adequacy of
the included economic variables by including dummy variables in some
estimates for the sub-Saharan African and Latin American regions.
Our data on population density, cultivation intensity, and irrigation
are drawn mainly from the F.A.O. Production Yearbooks.15 The data on
the conventional growth equation variables, including the black market
premium, are drawn from the data set assembled by R. Barro and J.-W.
Lee. Growth rates of real GDP, GDP per capita, and the investment ratio
in the latter data set are from R. Summers and A. Heston.16
Before presenting our results, it is worth emphasizing that our pre-
diction regarding the effects of population density and the farmer-to-land
ratio is exactly the reverse of what was the conventional wisdom in the
field of development economics around 1960. At that time, ‘‘overpopula-
tion’’ and paucity of natural resources relative to mouths to feed were
thought to constitute severe handicaps for development in most of Asia,
while the much more ‘‘favorable’’ balance between population and re-
sources led to much optimism about Africa’s prospects, with Latin
America’s outlook judged to lie somewhere in between. Our hypothesis
is that what had been taken as an opportune balance between resources
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and population was really an indication of a less favorable position on
the PID continuum and, thus, a hint of the possibility that the road to
modern economic growth might be a longer, rather than a shorter, one.
IV. Estimation and Results
To assess the influence of PID variables on growth we apply regression
analysis to data on a cross-section of nations. Our most general specifi-
cation of the regression model is as follows:
y i 5 a ¢ xi 1 ei (1)
Var(ei) 5 exp(b 0 1 b 1 qi) (2)
i 5 1, . . . , n, (3)
where yi is the average annual growth rate (in decimal form) of per cap-
ita GDP for country i for 1960–90, a is a 12 3 1 vector of unknown
coefficients, and xi is a 12 3 1 vector of regressors for country i, whose
first element is 1 and whose other elements are the following:
2. GDP60: GDP per capita in 1960;
3. Inv6090: Investment divided by GDP, averaged over 1960–90;
4. GPop6090: Growth rate of population (in decimal form), 1960–90;
5. Sec60: Share of children of secondary school age attending second-
ary schools (in decimal form) in 1960;
6. BMP6090: Black market premium, averaged over 1960–90;
7. Popden60: Population per hectare of land surface in 1960;
8. Manland60: Agricultural population per cultivated hectare in 1960;
9. Irrig60: Fraction of cultivated land that was irrigated in 1960;
10. PC1: First principal component of the previous three variables;
11. SAfrica: Dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa;
12. LaAm: Dummy variable for Latin America.
The term e i is a stochastic disturbance—including a measurement error
for the dependent variable—whose distribution may exhibit hetero-
skedasticity of the form indicated by equation (2); b 0 and b 1 are unknown
parameters; and qi is a quality rating for the GDP data of country i. This
quality rating ranges from 1 for countries with the lowest quality data (a
rating of D2) to 11 for those with the highest quality data (a rating of
A).17 We report weighted least squares estimates of a whenever an ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimate of b 1 is negative and otherwise report
OLS estimates of a .18
Conventional economic theory and previous empirical work suggest
that the coefficients of GDP60, GPop6090, and BMP6090 should be neg-
ative and those of Inv6090 and Sec60 should be positive. We expect any
one of our four proxies for PID (Popden60, Manland60, Irrig60, and
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TABLE 1
Averages for Different Subgroups of Countries
Sub-Saharan South, Southeast, Latin
Africa and East Asia America
Variable Name (32) (13) (22)
GDP per capita, 1960 842.533 1040.615 2185.091
[30] [13] [22]
Growth rate of GDP per capita,
1960–90 .7% 3.8% 1.2%
[21] [10] [19]
Population density, 1960 .314 5.607 .394
[32] [13] [22]
Farmers per hectare, 1960 1.714 5.447 1.55
[29] [12] [22]
Irrigated share of cultivated land,
1960 2.8 22.992 9.445
[22] [13] [22]
Note.—Numbers in parentheses represent the number of countries in each sub-
group. Numbers in square brackets represent the sample size for each average measure.
PC1) to have a positive estimated coefficient if the other proxies are
omitted. Thus, the same should be the case for their first principal com-
ponent.19 Previous empirical work suggests that the estimated coeffi-
cients of the regional dummies are likely to be negative.
Before turning to our statistical results, consider table 1, which
shows the means of GDP per capita in 1960, of the growth rate of real
GDP per capita from 1960 to 1990, and of our three measures of PID,
for the sample countries located in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in Asia
excluding the Middle East, and in Latin America. Together they account
for 85% of the sample of countries included in the exercises of tables 2–
4.20 Table 1 provides some intuition for the results presented below, as
it shows that the Asian countries exhibit the highest average population
density, number of farmers per acre cultivated and irrigated share of cul-
tivated area, and the highest rates of growth during 1960–90; that the
sub-Saharan African countries exhibit the lowest average levels of all of
these variables except farmers per hectare; and that the Latin American
countries occupy the middle positions except with regard to the latter
variable, farmers per hectare, with an average that is slightly smaller than
SSA’s. Growth rates are not obviously correlated with initial GDP per
capita across these groups.
The number of countries that provide sufficient data for inclusion
in our estimates varies depending on which if any proxies for PID are
used. For ease of comparison, in table 2 we report estimates of the vector
a for the common sample for which all three PID measures, as well as
the standard growth regression variables, are available, but in our discus-
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sion we also refer to the results obtained for the sample of maximum
size for the specification of a given column. In our main analysis, we
include all countries that did not belong to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1990 and for which
sufficient data were provided in our sources. This yields a sample of 48
countries when no PID variables are used, 46 countries when only popu-
lation density is used, 44 countries when only land per farmer is used,
42 countries when only irrigation intensity is used, and 41 countries
when all three PID variables, or their first principal component, are used.
(See table A1 for a list of included countries.) Constraining the last six
elements of a to equal zero, we obtain the estimates shown in the first
column. These have the expected signs, and for three of the five explana-
tory variables they are significant at the .05 level or better. This column
indicates that our sample of countries is similar to samples analyzed in
previous studies with regard to the relationship between the dependent
variable and the conventional regressors.21
In columns 2–5 we add the three basic PID variables and their first
principal component to the regression, one at a time. The estimated coef-
ficients are in each case positive and significant at the .01 level. In col-
umn 6 we report the results of including the regional dummy variables
in the regression. Their estimated coefficients are negative and signifi-
cant, as they have been in several previous studies. Finally, in column 7
are the results of including PC1 as well as the two regional dummies.
Their estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are significant
at the .01 level or better.
The hypothesis of this article is that PID has affected rates of eco-
nomic growth in the postwar era. We do not assert that preindustrial
growth affected industrialization similarly in all periods before 1945 or
that it will do so indefinitely. Since we do not assert that the relationship
between PID and growth will be stable over the very long run, it is rele-
vant to test for its stability over time. To this end, we split the 1960–90
period into two, 1960–75 and 1975–90. Table 3 presents the results for
the former subperiod, for which the dependent variable is the average
annual growth rate of per capita GDP for 1960–75 and the period-
specific regressors are, in an obvious notation, Inv6075, GPop6075, and
BMP6075. Table 4 presents the results for the latter subperiod, for which
the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita
GDP for 1975–90 and the period-specific regressors are, analogously,
Inv7590, GPop7590, and BMP7590. We retain PID measures based on
1960 data, since these proxy PID at earlier dates and are not meant to
track ‘‘initial PID’’ for the specific subperiod.22
For both subperiods, all estimated coefficients have the same signs
as for the full period. In many cases the adjusted R2 statistics and abso-
lute values of t-statistics are a bit lower for both subperiods than for the
full period, perhaps due to the greater influence of cyclical and random
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482 Economic Development and Cultural Change
influences on growth rates over shorter periods. Nonetheless, when the
PID variables enter the regressions, their estimated coefficients are al-
ways positive at the .05 level, with the exception of the coefficient of
irrigation share in the estimation for 1960–75, which is significant at .10
level.
Based on the common sample results shown in tables 2–4, both the
familiar criterion of the adjusted R2 statistic and the theoretically better
justified Schwarz criterion always favor the model that includes PC1 and
the regional dummies—that is, the model whose estimates are reported
in the last column of each table. It may also be of interest to compare
proportions of the total variance that are explained by the different mod-
els by reference to the R2 statistics. In the results for the minimal com-
mon sample of 41 countries for 1960–90, we find that the R2 statistics
for models 1–7 (1960–90) are .52, .69, .69, .65, .69, .74, and .82. Thus
we can say that when a PID variable is added to model 1, the increment
to R2 is at least .13 and typically .17, an addition to explained variance
similar to the .19 increment when only regional dummies are added.
Comparing the results for columns 1 and 7, we can say that the full
model explains almost 30% more of the variance in growth rates than
does the unaugmented model. The relative contribution of the PID vari-
ables to this extra explanatory power is comparable to that of the re-
gional dummies. Either of the first two PID variables or PC1 alone ex-
plain 35% of the variance unexplained by the base model, the regional
dummies (alone) explain 40% of that variance, and the addition of both
explains the better part, or 62.5%, of the otherwise unexplained vari-
ance.23
Considering the units in which our variables are expressed, we can
see that models 2, 3, and 4, estimated for 1960–90, imply respectively
that a country’s growth rate would have been increased one percentage
point if in 1960 its population density had been 10 persons per hectare
larger, if it had had five more farmers per cultivated hectare, or if its
irrigation share had been 25 percentage points higher. An alternative way
of expressing the economic importance of the PID variables is to com-
pute ‘‘beta-coefficients,’’ which indicate by how many standard devia-
tions the dependent variable increases when an independent variable
rises by one standard deviation. The beta coefficients for the PID vari-
ables, based on estimates for 1960–90, are .46 in model 2, .45 in model
3, .38 in model 4, .42 in model 5, and .38 in model 7. Among the stan-
dard variables, only the investment ratio and the black market premium
appear to have comparable impacts.24 Thus, the PID effects appear to
have been substantial. Having had the ‘‘right history’’ was as important
as having ‘‘gotten prices right.’’ Although history, unlike prices, cannot
itself be changed, nonetheless there may be policy implications of this
finding, as we argue in the final section.
As mentioned earlier, we were unable to obtain data on most of the
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PID variables for years earlier than 1960, but we were able to find data
on population density in 1911 for a subset of countries in our sample.
To check the sensitivity of our results to demographic changes between
1911 and 1960, which could conceivably reflect contaminating influ-
ences of early industrialization efforts, we reestimated equations of the
types shown in tables 2–4, using population density in 1911 rather than
1960. Since we do not have data on the other PID variables for a compa-
rable date, we entered Popden11 as the only PID variable in these runs.
Table 5 shows the results of reestimating the equations corresponding to
columns 1, 2, and a modified version of column 7 of table 2, for the 31-
country subsample available for the 1960–90 period. The other results
are roughly the same as those shown in table 2, and we find that the 1911
and 1960 values of population density perform almost identically when
the same subsample of countries is examined, although the absolute
value of the coefficient on Popden11 is as much as an order of magnitude
larger than that on Popden60. Not shown in table 5 are qualitatively
identical results obtained for the 50-country sample for which parallel
estimates can be performed for 1960–75, and for the 32-country sample
for which this can be done for 1975–90. These exercises suggest that the
PID variables, measured in 1960, which are used in the runs reported in
the tables, are indeed good proxies for PID at a considerably earlier pe-
riod. At least they do not lead to exaggerated estimates of the importance
of preindustrial conditions to modern growth. Indeed, judging from these
estimates, the estimates of tables 2–4, which use 1960 measures for PID,
could significantly understate the magnitudes of the economic impact of
PID, more accurately measured.
V. Further Tests and Extensions
While impressive, the tests reported above are by no means conclusive.
Among other things, we would like to know how sensitive the results are
to equation specification (e.g., the possibility of missing variables), sam-
ple, and the precise period analyzed. We have been able to conduct a
few further explorations, which we report here, with further work re-
maining for the future.
First, we conducted some checks of the robustness of our conclu-
sions to the composition of the developing-country sample. That sample
includes all non-OECD countries with data for the variables under study,
and it appears to be broadly representative of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.25 Checking the values of the PID variables, we found two
countries, Hong Kong and Singapore, to have been substantial outliers,
especially for population density and cultivation intensity.26 Hong Kong
and Pakistan are also found to be outliers when irrigation share is the
only PID variable. Reestimating the models without Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore, we find that the coefficients of the PID variables retain their ex-
pected positive signs and are usually little changed in magnitude, al-
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though their significance levels are often lower. However, when we
allow better representation of the East Asian countries by adding obser-
vations for mainland China and South Korea (for which some data were
lacking in the sources on which we relied for the rest of the sample),
significance of the PID variables is no longer sensitive to inclusion of
those outliers, as shown in table 6.27 Neither the coefficient estimates nor
their significance levels are significantly affected by dropping any other
country from the 41-country sample of the table 2 estimates.
Second, in view of the reservation raised above about the effects of
wastelands on our population density variable, we estimated an equation
paralleling models 2–4 of tables 2–4 but included the ratio of population
to cultivated area in hectares as the lone PID measure. As expected, the
coefficients on this variable are positive and significant at levels (always
better than .01) similar to those on Popden60 and Manland60 for the full
period and both subperiods. The coefficient on the new variable is also
positive and significant at the .05 level or better when China and South
Korea are added to the sample or are substituted for outliers Hong Kong
and Singapore.28
The possibilities for investigating the impact of excluding relevant
variables are virtually endless. We confined our initial investigations to
three sets of variables. First, we were impressed with the impact of eth-
nic heterogeneity in explaining, in particular, Africa’s relative perfor-
mance, as shown by W. Easterly and R. Levine.29 To investigate the de-
gree to which their ethnic heterogeneity variables might capture the same
influences reflected by our PID measures,30 we reestimated models 5 and
7 for the three periods of tables 2–4 adding in turn the two main mea-
sures of ethnic heterogeneity used by Easterly and Levine.31 In the re-
sulting estimates, the coefficient on PC1 remains significant at the .01
level (usually with slightly increased significance) with almost no change
in its point estimate. Ethnic heterogeneity has the expected sign but is
significant at the .05 level only for the 1960–90 period, when PC1 is
included.32
Second, the possibility was raised that the PID variables might be
serving as imperfect proxies for ‘‘initial health capital’’ and that the esti-
mates of their effects might be biased by exclusion of more direct mea-
sures of that variable from our equations. We accordingly carried out a
set of estimates in which life expectancy at birth in 1960 was added to
the explanatory variable set of model 7.33 The results showed that the
coefficient on life expectancy is indeed positive and significant in this
setting, but that the addition of this variable does not change the sign or
significance level of PC1 or of the individual PID variables in their re-
spective equations.34
Third, we were intrigued by J. Sachs and A. Warner’s apparent suc-
cess in explaining differences between African and non-African eco-
nomic growth using a number of different policy and resource vari-
This content downloaded from 131.128.70.27 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 11:26:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TA
BL
E
6
G
ro
w
th
of
G
D
P
pe
r
C
ap
it
a,
19
60
–
90
(w
ith
ou
tH
on
g
K
on
g
o
r
Si
ng
ap
or
e,
bu
ti
nc
lu
di
ng
Ch
in
a
an
d
So
ut
h
K
or
ea
)
In
de
pe
nd
en
tV
ar
ia
bl
e
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]a
[4
]a
[5
]a
[6
]
[7
]
Co
ns
ta
nt
.
00
7
.
00
5
.
00
1
.
00
8
.
01
2
.
02
8
.
03
2
(.6
01
)
(.4
46
)
(.0
66
)
(.7
41
)
(1.
04
8)
(2.
36
9)*
*
(2.
98
9)*
G
D
P6
0
2
8.
10
e2
06
2
5.
40
e2
06
2
5.
93
e2
06
2
6.
27
e2
06
2
5.
41
e2
06
2
5.
21
e2
06
2
2.
85
e2
06
(2
4.
08
3)*
(2
2.
44
2)*
*
(2
2.
68
9)*
(2
3.
10
5)*
(2
2.
51
3)*
*
(2
2.
45
3)*
*
(2
1.
37
8)
se
c6
0
.
05
3
.
01
6
.
05
4
.
03
2
.
03
5
.
00
5
2
.
01
8
(1.
98
7)*
**
(.5
43
)
(2.
19
1)*
*
(1.
13
8)
(1.
28
8)
(.1
91
)
(2
.
73
4)
G
PO
P6
09
0
2
.
03
8
2
.
14
8
2
.
04
7
2
.
10
3
2
.
11
8
2
.
22
5
2
.
39
1
(2
.
10
3)
(2
.
42
5)
(2
.
13
2)
(2
.
29
2)
(2
.
33
5)
(2
.
70
0)
(2
1.
32
6)
IN
V
60
90
.
11
9
.
13
0
.
10
0
.
09
6
.
10
2
.
10
0
.
10
4
(2.
66
8)*
(3.
06
6)*
(2.
46
4)*
*
(2.
43
9)*
*
(2.
58
4)*
(2.
55
7)*
*
(2.
95
7)*
B
M
P6
09
0
2
.
00
2
2
.
00
2
2
.
00
1
2
.
00
3
2
.
00
2
2
.
00
5
2
.
00
6
(2
.
45
6)
(2
.
46
8)
(2
.
24
7)
(2
.
82
)
(2
.
56
1)
(2
1.
01
9)
(2
1.
39
3)
Po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
.
00
9
(2.
29
7)*
*
Fa
rm
er
s
pe
rh
ec
ta
re
.
00
3
(2.
17
5)*
*
Ir
rig
at
io
n
sh
ar
e
.
00
04
(2.
58
4)*
PC
1
.
00
8
.
00
7
(2.
65
3)*
(2.
97
2)*
Su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fri
ca
du
m
m
y
2
.
02
2
2
.
01
8
(2
3.
62
9)*
(2
3.
39
0)*
La
tin
A
m
er
ic
a
du
m
m
y
2
.
01
3
2
.
01
1
(2
2.
59
3)*
(2
2.
49
1)*
*
n
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
R2
.
52
.
58
.
59
.
61
.
61
.
66
.
73
ad
j.R
2
.
45
.
51
.
51
.
54
.
54
.
59
.
67
F
te
st N
ot
e.
—
N
um
be
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
ar
e
t-
st
at
ist
ic
s.
a
Si
gn
ifi
es
u
n
w
ei
gh
te
d
re
gr
es
sio
n.
*
St
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
.
01
le
ve
l.
*
*
St
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
.
05
le
ve
l.
*
*
*
St
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
.
10
le
ve
l.
486
This content downloaded from 131.128.70.27 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 11:26:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
John P. Burkett, Catherine Humblet, and Louis Putterman 487
ables.35 Unlike other studies, Sachs and Warner show that the dummy for
sub-Saharan Africa (along with ethnic heterogeneity and the growth rates
of neighboring countries) becomes insignificant when variables includ-
ing life expectancy, the natural resource export fraction of GDP, central
government saving, tropical climate, access to the sea, and indicators of
openness to trade are controlled for. Sachs and Warner’s specification
differs from the regressions so far reported in a variety of ways. To keep
our investigation manageable, we tested whether the effects of PID re-
main significant even after controlling for the variables used by Sachs
and Warner both by (a) adding their distinctive variable set to the set of
explanatory variables in our model 7, and (b) by adding our PID vari-
ables to the explanatory variables in their most comprehensive model,
shown in table 2 of their paper. It is not possible to report the full set of
results here, but it can be summarized by stating that in some settings
at least the PID variables appear to explain some of the growth vari-
ance left unexplained by the variables that Sachs and Warner used, just
as it explains otherwise unexplained variance in the models shown in
tables 2–6.36
Finally, while our hypothesis is meant to apply mainly to countries
at an early stage of industrialization during the postwar period, it is inter-
esting to investigate whether it holds at some broad level when all coun-
tries for which the relevant data are available, including those of Western
Europe and other OECD member states, are included. During the post-
war era, the growth performances as well as the population densities,
cultivation intensities, and irrigation ratios of European countries were
on average intermediate between those of Asia and of Latin America.37
We reestimated the equations of tables 2–4, adding European and other
OECD countries, and found that our hypothesis appears to hold as well
or better for this larger sample. As might be expected, the improvement
is less noticeable when all of the OECD countries are added, because the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have European-like
economies but lower population densities and more land per farmer.38 By
contrast, inclusion of Japan, a high-density and high-growth country,
strengthens the qualitative result of the tables with respect to the PID
variables. These results suggest that the linkage between PID and mod-
ern economic growth that is hypothesized in this article has been a
worldwide phenomenon and not one that holds only for the less devel-
oped countries.39
VI. Implications and Conclusion
We have shown that any one of our three indicators of PID typically con-
tributes as much to the explanation of recent economic growth as do any
of the more standard variables analyzed by Barro, Levine and Renelt,
and others, and that the addition of these variables to their equations ex-
plains roughly the same fraction of the growth residual otherwise picked
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up by regional dummies and the better part (57%) of that majority of the
growth residual that is explained when both PID indicators and regional
dummies are added. If the trends highlighted by this initial exploration
were to be confirmed, what would be their implication for economic pol-
icy? Since the PID variables are givens to each country from the present
standpoint, what does their inclusion in our study contribute beyond
what we already know from the significance of regional dummy vari-
ables or of such exogenous factors as the tropical climate dummy used
by Sachs and Warner?
While our analysis suggests only that three demographic and re-
source variables have influenced recent economic growth, we propose
that these variables are indicators of stages along a long-term historical
development continuum. We argue that the reason why a country’s PID
status helps to determine its measured performance in the early decades
of the push for modern economic growth is that different countries’
human-capital stocks broadly understood as including informal learning,
culture, and the collective knowledge base, as well perhaps as certain
physical infrastructures like canals and irrigation networks, were differ-
entially pre-positioned to respond to the possibility of modern growth.40
To tease out further implications from the analysis, we need to ask
how the paths traveled by each country both in the recent past and in the
near future are likely to affect the preparedness for industrialization. For
us, the idea that ways of economic life in their entirety influence coun-
tries’ capacities for modern economic development suggests that the way
forward for the less-developed countries should include attention not
only to the impact of formal education,41 but also to that of a wider array
of factors including citizens’ participation in market activity, employ-
ment, exposure to modern ideas and practices, and opportunities for en-
trepreneurship. Since favorable changes with respect to these factors
could influence positively the long-term capacity for development in
ways that may not show up for some time in output figures, improvement
in the human base for development might be treated as a medium-term
goal in its own right. Put differently, our results may be seen as provid-
ing support for the ‘‘capacity-building’’ emphasis in some recent devel-
opment programs. But exactly what form effective human-development
efforts should take is beyond the scope of our discussion.
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Appendix
TABLE A1
Country List
1960–90 1960–75 1975–90
[2] [6] [2] [6] [2] [6]
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Angola u
Benin u u
Botswana u
Burundi u u u u u u
Cameroon u u u u u u
Central African Republic u u u
Chad u
Congo u u u
Gabon u
Gambia u u
Ghana u u
Kenya u u u u u u
Lesotho u u u
Liberia u
Madagascar u u
Malawi u u u u u u
Mauritania u
Mali u u
Mauritius u
Mozambique u u
Niger u u
Nigeria u u u u u u
Rwanda u u u
Senegal u u u u u u
Sierra Leone u u
South Africa u u u u u u
Sudan u u
Tanzania u u
Togo u u u u u u
Uganda u u
Zaire u
Zambia u u u u u u
Latin America:
Argentina u u u u u u
Bolivia u u u u u u
Brazil u u u u u u
Chile u u u u u u
Colombia u u u u u u
Costa Rica u u u u u u
Dominican Republic u u u u u u
Ecuador u u u u u u
El Salvador u u u u u u
Guatemala u u u u u u
Guyana u u
Haiti u u
Honduras u u u u u u
Jamaica u u
Mexico u u u u u u
Nicaragua u u
489
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TABLE A1 (Continued )
1960–90 1960–75 1975–90
[2] [6] [2] [6] [2] [6]
Panama u u
Paraguay u u u u u u
Peru u u
Trinidad and Tobago u u
Uruguay u u u u u u
Venezuela u u u u u u
Asia (except West Asia):
Bangladesh u u u
Hong Kong u u u u u u
India u u u u u u
Indonesia u u u u u u
Malaysia u u u u u u
Myanmar u u
Nepal u u
Pakistan u u u u u u
Philippines u u u u u u
Singapore u u u u u u
Sri Lanka u u
Taiwan u u u u u u
Thailand u u u u u u
Other:
Algeria u u u u u u
Cyprus u u u u u u
Egypt u
Iran u u
Iraq u u
Israel u u u u u u
Jordan u u u u u u
Morocco u u u u u u
Papua New Guinea u
Syria u u u u u u
Tunisia u u u u u u
Turkey u u u u u u
Note.—A check indicates that all data required for the specification of the indicated
column corresponding to tables 2–4 are available. In the case of the column [2] specifica-
tion, this means that the country observation is included in the maximum sample esti-
mates reported in the text. All estimates shown in tables 2–4 are for the samples for
which the column [6] and [8] specification can be estimated. Results for samples that
include countries having a check under [2] but not [6] are mentioned in the text but not
shown in tables 2–4.
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1. United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Africa,
and Development Alternatives, Inc., Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms
for Capacity Building in Africa, Elliot Berg, coordinator (New York: UNDP,
1993), pp. 59–60.
2. Even W. W. Rostow’s well-known Stages of Economic Growth (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) dealt only with steps in the transition
from a basically undifferentiated ‘‘traditional’’ economy and thus bears no simi-
larity to the multistage conceptions discussed below.
3. Ester Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of
Agricultural Change under Population Pressure (New York: Aldine, 1965), and
Population and Technology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981); Elman Service,
Cultural Evolutionism: Theory in Practice (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Win-
ston, 1971); Allen Johnson and Timothy Earl, The Evolution of Human Socie-
ties: From Foraging Groups to Agrarian State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1987). Marvin Goodfriend and John McDermott, ‘‘Early
Development,’’ American Economic Review 85 (March 1995): 116–33, make a
similar departure from past economic literature by modeling development as a
series of stages, in their case a premarket period, a period of preindustrial market
development, and modern industrial growth. Human capital and population den-
sity also play crucial roles in their approach, as they do in this article. However,
theirs is largely a theoretical exercise, does not posit a continuum of develop-
mental stages, and does not predict a link between stage of preindustrial growth
and postwar economic performance.
4. Although hunter-gatherers were already of marginal significance on the
eve of the worldwide spread of industry, a good part of that continuum continued
to be represented.
5. An earlier exposition of these ideas is found in Louis Putterman, ‘‘Social
Capital and Development Capacity: The Example of Rural Tanzania,’’ Develop-
ment Policy Review 13 (March 1995): 5–22. A somewhat expanded treatment
of the ideas summarized in the present article is given in John Burkett, Catherine
Humblet, and Louis Putterman, ‘‘Pre-Industrial and Post-War Economic Devel-
opment: Is There a Link?’’ Working Paper no. 96-25 (Brown University, De-
partment of Economics, 1996; revised 1997).
6. Collective knowledge or capability, including tacit elements maintained
and transmitted by active use, is discussed by Richard Nelson and Sidney Win-
ter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
7. Jonathan Temple and Paul Johnson’s ‘‘Social Capability and Economic
Development,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 3 (August 1998): 965–
90, which investigates the effect of measures of social development of the type
studied by Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris (Society, Politics and Economic
Development [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967]), bears a close
relationship to our study, if one believes that their social indicators are appro-
priate measures of the ‘‘broad human capital’’ that we hypothesize to be associ-
ated with PID. (See also Moses Abromovitz, ‘‘Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and
Falling Behind,’’ Journal of Economic History 46 [June 1986]: 385–406.) The
differences between their approach and ours are (a) that they provide no eco-
nomic-historical framework to explain why social development differed among
countries in the 1960s, and (b) that we use direct physical measures of PID
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rather than social development measures, which might be considered more ‘‘epi-
phenomenal’’ and which are in many cases rather subjective in character.
8. A more ideal measure would be the average population density of a
country’s regions, provinces, or other subnational units, weighted by regional
population. Unfortunately, such detailed information is difficult to obtain for a
large sample of countries.
9. Another potential problem is mechanization, which gives rise to lower
man-to-land ratios at the industrialized end of the continuum. Fortunately, mech-
anization would have had next to no impact on farmer-to-land ratios in the de-
veloping countries that are the focus of our analysis.
10. Thus a referee (as well as Robert Wade, Brown University, in personal
communication, 1997) argued that not irrigating may simply reflect not needing
to irrigate. A measure that has an advantage over the irrigation share in this re-
spect is the multiple cropping index, i.e., the average number of crops grown
per year per parcel. This has been found to perform extremely well in a paper
paralleling this study but in which the cross-sectional units are provinces in
China, rather than countries (Ambar Narayan and Louis Putterman, ‘‘Pre-Indus-
trial Development and Modern Economic Growth: Evidence from Regional Data
for China’’ [Brown University, Department of Economics, 1998, photocopied]).
Unfortunately, we did not find the index in the F.A.O. Yearbooks and other data
sources we investigated, and thus we could not use it in this study.
11. Ross Levine and David Renelt, ‘‘A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-
Country Growth Regressions,’’ American Economic Review 82 (September
1992): 942–63; Robert Barro, ‘‘Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Coun-
tries,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (May 1991): 407–44; Roger Kor-
mendi and Philip Meguire, ‘‘Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-
Country Evidence,’’ Journal of Monetary Economics 63 (September 1985):
141–63.
12. As will be noted again below, we do not posit any particular relation-
ship between formal education and the types of human capital that one would
expect to derive from the nature of the preindustrial economy. Thus, findings
about the effects of formal education on growth have no direct bearing on the
hypothesis that PID has affected growth through broad characteristics of the hu-
man-capital stock.
13. Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, ‘‘Sources of Economic Growth,’’
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40 (June 1994): 1–46;
Robert Barro, ‘‘Democracy and Growth,’’ Journal of Economic Growth 1
(March 1996): 1–27; Roberto Perotti, ‘‘Growth, Income Distribution, and De-
mocracy: What the Data Say,’’ Journal of Economic Growth 1 (June 1996):
149–87.
14. Development economists have long argued that many economies oper-
ate with greatly reduced economic efficiency because government interventions,
e.g., in banking, import controls, and foreign-exchange management led to arti-
ficially reduced capital and import costs, higher labor costs, and lower profit-
ability of exports. The black market premium should be an accurate measure of
one of these distortions, the degree of currency overvaluation, which is likely to
be highly correlated with others. The purchasing power parity of investment
goods, the variable favored by Perotti, seems less satisfactory because purchas-
ing power parities tend to be systematically associated with levels of develop-
ment for reasons that may have little to do with the kinds of price distortion in
question here.
15. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, F.A.O. Pro-
duction Yearbook (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions, 1970, 1978). Data on total land area, arable land, and irrigated land in
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1960 were taken from the 1978 yearbook; data on agricultural population in
1960 were taken from the 1970 yearbook. The total population data for 1960
were taken from the data used by Barro and Lee.
16. Robert Summers and Alan Heston, ‘‘The Penn World Tables (Mark 5):
An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988,’’ Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 106 (May 1991): 327–68.
17. Ibid.
18. Most of the estimates of b 1 are both negative and statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that the expected variance in data quality may in fact exist.
However, checks of alternative estimates suggest that the qualitative nature of
the results is affected little by whether or not the weights are used.
19. Since the four proxies are positively correlated, we cannot be confident
of the signs of the estimated coefficients when more than one proxy is included.
We therefore omit such estimates.
20. A country is included in the computations of this table if we have suf-
ficient data to include it in at least one of the regression estimates shown in ta-
bles 2, 3, or 4. See table A1.
21. Results for the larger sample of 48 countries are qualitatively similar,
but the coefficient on GDP60 becomes significant at the .01 level, and that on
BMP not significant at the .05 level. The insignificant negative coefficients on
population growth for the 1960–90 period as a whole, both in this and the other
columns of the table, are consistent with the positive coefficients for the 1960–
75 subperiod and negative coefficients for the 1975–90 subperiod, shown in
tables 2 and 3. Note that while our hypothesis stipulates that high population den-
sity at the outset of the industrial era would be associated with conditions favor-
able to modern economic growth, it involves no prediction regarding the effects
of population growth after the commencement of the drive for industrialization.
22. Recall that 1960 data were used because these were the earliest we
could obtain for a broad subsample of countries. The common use of data for
the year 1960 both for the PID measures and for the initial GDP and education
variables in the 1960–90 and 1960–75 estimates is strictly coincidental.
23. We also estimated, but do not show, a model in which all three individ-
ual PID variables appear simultaneously with the other variables. The R2 for this
model is .74, suggesting that it explains more of the total variance, as well as
of the variance unexplained by model 1, than does the model adding the region
dummies only. As mentioned earlier, however, it is difficult to interpret the indi-
vidual PID coefficients, since the three variables are correlated. Although they
pass an F-test for joint significance at the .001 level, only one of them, irrigation,
shows a significant coefficient.
24. To provide points of comparison, we note that the b coefficients for
GDP60, Sec60, GPOP6090, INV6090, and BMP6090 in model 7 are 2.18,
2.09, 2.06, .32, 2.19 .
25. A major gap in coverage is that of the former Communist countries.
26. Hong Kong, a British colony absorbed by China in 1997, is treated as
a country in World Bank data up to this writing, by Summers and Heston, and
in most of the cross-sectional growth studies referred to above.
27. Our main sample did not include South Korea because the growth rate
of GDP per capita of that country in 1985–90 is not given in Barro and Lee.
Also missing from that source are data for China. We filled in the missing
growth rate for South Korea, using the World Bank’s World Tables (published
for the World Bank by Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992). Miss-
ing data for China were obtained by taking intermediate estimates from those
offered by a variety of specialized sources, in consultation with Barry Naughton,
University of California, San Diego. Details are provided in John Burkett, Cath-
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erine Humblet, Ambar Narayan, and Louis Putterman, ‘‘Appendix to Burkett,
Humblet and Putterman,’’ unpublished paper (Brown University, 1998; hereafter
cited as BHNP).
28. The one exception is the 1960–75 period, for which the coefficient is
insignificant (but still positive) in the sample that substitutes the former for the
latter countries. Results are shown in BHNP.
29. William Easterly and Ross Levine, ‘‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies
and Ethnic Divisions,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (November 1997):
1203–50.
30. Societies nearer to the less intensive end of the PID spectrum would
have tended to have had smaller units of social integration (e.g., tribes), more
of which would thus be included in the boundaries of today’s typically larger
nation-states.
31. This is an ethnic heterogeneity index constructed by scholars in the
then–Soviet Union, as well as the average of that index and of several non-
Soviet indexes of ethnic heterogeneity.
32. Only the average ethnic heterogeneity index is significant. Both indices
have significant coefficients of the predicted sign for 1960–90, but not for the
subperiods, when PC1 is not included, for these samples. Sample sizes are 40,
55, and 46 for 1960–90, 1960–75, and 1975–90, respectively. Results for the
1960–90 period are included in BHNP. Results are similar when China and
South Korea are substituted for Hong Kong and Singapore, as in table 6.
33. While life expectancy is a possible proxy for human-health capital, it
is also an important measure of well-being and in that respect an outcome of
economic performance. To what extent life expectancy or other physical quality
of life or human-development measures might be determined by such underlying
factors as initial income and legacies of premodern development versus govern-
ment policies or other factors is an interesting question that we are unable to
explore here. (We did some exploratory regressions on our sample and found
that about 57% of the variance of life expectancy in 1960 within our sample
appears to be explained by a constant term, GDP per capita in 1960, and the
three PID measures.) For an exploration of the determinants of the physical qual-
ity of life, see John Burkett, ‘‘Systemic Influences on the Physical Quality of
Life: A Bayesian Analysis of Cross-Sectional Data,’’ Journal of Comparative
Economics 9 (June 1985): 145–63.
34. See BHNP.
35. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, ‘‘Sources of Slow Growth in Afri-
can Economies,’’ working paper (Harvard Institute for International Develop-
ment, March 1997). This version differs slightly from that published under the
same title in the Journal of African Economics 6, no. 3 (December 1997): 335–
76.
36. For further details and a sample result, see BHNP.
37. These statements apply mainly to Western Europe. Comparable data
for former Communist East and Central Europe are not provided in our sources.
38. In our 1997 paper (n. 5 above), we argue that where indigenous popula-
tion densities were sufficiently low, as in North America and Australia, coloniza-
tion and subsequent immigration led to substitution of the indigenous PID corre-
lates by the human-capital profile associated with the PID level of the colonizers.
We also point out that as the location of the first industrial revolution was proba-
bly not predictable on the basis of population density only, PID as we measure
it is not a sufficient condition for industrialization. This opens up complex issues
for further discussion.
39. The basic result for the sample including both OECD and non-OECD
countries is included in BHNP.
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40. Our hypothesis with respect to human capital may be viewed as similar
to the ‘‘social capability’’ concept that Temple and Johnson (n. 7 above; in re-
search that came to our attention after completing this project) take from Abro-
movitz (n. 7 above) and other earlier writers. Perhaps the main difference be-
tween their approach and ours is that whereas they take ‘‘social capability’’ to
be an unexplained variable that is measured directly by an index based on such
factors as ‘‘extent of dualism,’’ ‘‘extent of social mobility,’’ and ‘‘degree of
modernization of outlook,’’ we carry our analysis back one step to the long his-
torical perspective of economic anthropologists and others, and our tests proceed
on the assumption that direct measures of production-system intensity may be
superior to measures of consequences, some of which are unavoidably subjec-
tive. The relationship between the PID and the social capability concepts de-
serves investigation in future work.
41. Indeed, formal education fails to show systematic impact in the results
obtained here, perhaps due to difficulties of measurement. See also Lant Prit-
chett, ‘‘Where Has All the Education Gone?’’ unpublished paper (World Bank,
Washington, D.C., 1995) and sources cited therein.
This content downloaded from 131.128.70.27 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 11:26:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 131.128.70.27 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 11:26:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
